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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff appeals from the Fifth Judicial District Court's
entry of judgment in favor of defendant Neal C. Capel, M.D.
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Section
78-2-2(3) Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does a patient's voluntary acquiescence to and

acceptance of requested medical care constitute consent to
treatment?
2.

Is a wife's expressed, written consent for her spouse

valid?
3.

Were the plaintiff's constitutional rights violated by

the defendant's reliance upon the plaintiff's acquiescence and
acceptance of treatment and upon the written consent of the
plaintiff's spouse?
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61.

No error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by
any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not effect the
substantial rights of the party.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1953, as amended) (set forth

as Addendum A).

3.

Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-3 (1953, as amended) (set forth

as Addendum B).
4.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-5(1) (1953, as amended) (set

forth as Addendum C).
5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(4) (1953, as amended) (set

forth as Addendum D).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This case is a medical malpractice action in which the

plaintiff alleges Dr. Capel performed surgery on him without his
consent.

It is undisputed that the surgery Dr. Capel performed

was medically indicated and was skillfully done.

It is further

undisputed that plaintiff was fully informed of the nature of the
prospective surgery.

It is also undisputed that plaintiff's wife

signed a consent form authorizing the very surgery performed.
Finally, there is no dispute that plaintiff was wholly unable to
produce medical expert testimony establishing the surgery caused
harm to plaintiff.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.
This action came on regularly for jury trial on January 29,

1990 before the Honorable Philip Eves, Fifth Judicial District
Court.

Both plaintiff and defendant appeared personally and by

and through counsel.
opening statements.

The parties selected a jury and presented
After the parties1 opening statements, the
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parties stipulated to proffer the evidence upon which the court
could determine whether a sufficient factual and legal basis had
been shown to submit the case to the jury.

At the conclusion of

the proffer, defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented in light of the applicable statutory requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act,
§ 78-14-1 et seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
The trial court concluded plaintiff failed to establish the
requisite elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice.
Specifically, the facts indicated implied consent on the part of
the patient authorized the surgery.

Further, while written

consent is not required, the hospital consent form signed by the
plaintiff's wife specifically authorized the surgery performed by
Dr. Capel.

The court found Dr. Capel was authorized as a matter

of law to rely on said implied and express consent in performing
the surgery.

Further, the court found that without expert test-

imony establishing physical damages were proximately caused by
Dr. Capel's conduct, both a claim for lack of informed consent
and a claim for medical malpractice failed as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss with
prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,

attached hereto as Addendum E).
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C.

Statement of Facts,
The plaintiff, Michel Lounsbury, was injured on the job on

October 10, 1986. He reported walking across planking carrying a
700 pound laminated beam when the planking gave way, leaving
plaintiff supporting the weight of the beam by himself.
Medical Center records [hereafter M.R.] p. 6; Tr. 47.)
seen initially by Dr. Noel Robinson of Beaver.

(Dixie
He was

X-rays were taken

revealing a fractured vertebrae and herniated disc.

fid.)

Plaintiff later had a lumbar CT Scan on October 23rd and a
myelogram on November 20th both of which confirmed the presence
of a herniated disc at L5-S1 and a limbus fragment at the
superior anterior margin on L4.

(Tr. 48.)

Mr. Lounsbury remained totally disabled from his injuries
despite conservative treatment; consequently, he sought care from
two orthopedic surgeons, Dr. David Moore and Dr. Glen Momberger.
(Tr. 62.)

Both physicians concluded that surgery was necessary

if Mr. Lounsbury wanted to improve.

After receiving these

reports, the Industrial Commission advised the plaintiff that he
would either have to have surgery or would receive future
benefits only for the degree of disability he would be expected
to have following corrective surgery.

When he learned that

Dr. Momberger would not be available to perform the surgery,
Mr. Lounsbury chose to go to Dr. Capel.
Michel Lounsbury's deposition.)
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(Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 to

The plaintiff and his wife met Dr. Capel in April of 1987.
The proposed surgery was discussed in detail and Dr. Capel
reviewed the potential complications.

Dr. Capel charted:

Patient has been given an explanation of the problem
and its proposed treatment, has agreed with the course.
Complications have been discussed and every efforts
[sic] made to reduce the chance of these developing.
(M.R., p. 9.)

Thus, prior to surgery, Dr. Capel obtained the

patient's verbal consent to the proposed surgery.

(Tr. 64.)

As is Dr. Capel's practice, a "fresh" or repeat myelogram
and contrast CT scan were ordered in advance of the scheduled
surgery.

(Tr. 60.)

Accordingly, the patient was admitted to the

hospital the day before surgery.

At this time, he signed an

admission form acknowledging he was being admitted for back
surgery.

(M.R., p. 3.)

From the time of his admission to the hospital until the
time he was discharged, Mr. Lounsbury voluntarily submitted,
acquiesced and even assisted with each and every preoperative
step undertaken by the hospital staff.

Specifically, at 12:15 on

May 14, 1987, he was admitted and oriented to his room.

At 1300

he asked for and received medication for complaints of back pain.
After receiving this and subsequent pain medication, the nurse
charted that the plaintiff remained "awake and alert."

(M.R., p.

52.)
At 1530 he was taken to radiology.

The repeat myelogram

confirmed the large central herniation of L5-S1 disc which had
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worsened since the prior examination.

(M.R., p. 27; Tr. 60.)

Dr. Capel testified it is his unvarying practice to discuss the
results of such preoperative exams with his patients and he
believes he did so with the plaintiff.

(Depo. Dr. Capel, pp. 28-

30.)
After returning to his room at 1700, plaintiff complained of
pain again and at 1710 another pain shot was given.

At 2030 he

was "awake and alert" with "no complaints of back discomfort."
He was given coffee as he requested.
At 2200 preparations began for the surgery.

A Fleets enema

was given to which the patient expressed no objection.
Mr. Lounsbury took a hibiclens shower using a specially treated
soap to kill bacteria on his skin.

At 2300, 11:00 p.m., the

preoperative teaching was done and the patient was instructed
that he could eat or drink nothing after midnight.

The nurse

charted that the plaintiff "voices his understanding" that he
will be allowed nothing by mouth beginning at midnight and,
accordingly, at one minute after midnight, the patient's water
was removed from his room.

(M.R., pp. 51-52.)

Mr. Lounsbury slept until 5:40 a.m. when he was awakened for
surgery.

At this point he hadn't received any pain medication

for over six hours.

The charting by the nurse on duty, Charlotte

Chatterton, reflected that the patient fully cooperated with a
lengthy and thorough surgical prep.

(M.R., p. 53.)

Had he

voiced any objection or reluctance, the nurses would have
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abruptly discontinued the preoperative procedure.

(Tr. pp.

62-64.)
Here, with plaintiff's assistance, Nurse Chatterton shaved
his back, sent him in for another shower instructing him to scrub
his back carefully, and on his return she gave him a sterile
scrub lasting 15 minutes and requiring has assistance.

She then

wrapped his back with sterile surgical wrap and put TED hose on
his legs from his toes to his groin.

At 6:10 the nurse charted

that the patient was "relaxed" and that he has been NPO since
24:00.
void.

The nurse also charted that he was up to the bathroom to
Not until 6:25 a.m. were the preoperative medications

given.

(M.R., p. 53.)

Because it was hospital policy at Dixie Medical Center to
not allow any patient who had received pain medications to sign
for surgery, the patient was instructed to call his wife early on
the morning of surgery.

(Tr. pp. 64-65.)

He willingly complied.

Mrs. Lounsbury was told by her husband to come in as he was being
taken in for surgery.

She hurried to the hospital, signed the

consent form, and at 7:20, a full body sock was put on the
patient.

The nurses double-checked the preoperative check list

and made sure it was complete, then wheeled the patient to the
operating room on his bed.

(Tr. 65; M.R. p. 53.)

Dr. Capel had nothing to do with obtaining the signature of
either the patient or his spouse prior to surgery.

This was a

function performed by the Dixie Medical Center nursing personnel
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out of Dr. Capel's presence and without his knowledge or
involvement.

(Tr. 76.)

As far as Dr. Capel was concerned, the plaintiff arrived in
the surgical suite at 7:20 a.m. on the morning of May 15, 1987
for a scheduled surgery.

From Dr. Capel1s point of view, the

plaintiff voluntarily went to the hospital; voluntarily complied
with all of the preoperative steps; and verbally agreed to the
surgery.

Furthermore, a consent form had been signed by his wife

in accordance with hospital policy and the preoperative myelogram
confirmed the need for surgery.
in order and routine.

Thus, everything was completely

(Tr. 97.)

It is also important to note

that it is uncontested that the surgery went well, that it was
well-advised, and skillfully performed.

(Tr. 54 and discussion

pp. 81-89.)
After the surgery Mr. Lounsbury expressed no objections,
concerns or problems about having received the operation.

The

nurses' notes indicate that Mr. Lounsbury was returned from
surgery at 11:30 on the morning of May 15, 1987.
reported that he was feeling better.

At 2245, he was awake,

alert and oriented, requesting coffee.
or requests.

By 1616 he

He voiced no complaints

By the next afternoon, the nurse noted that the

patient was Min good spirits"; he was "voicing no complaints."
(M.R., p. 56.)

By 4:00 in the afternoon on the day after

surgery, the nurse on duty charted:
optimistic and cooperative."

"Patient is very cheerful,

(M.R., p. 57.)
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Incredibly,

assuming throughout this entire period of time, plaintiff was
convinced unauthorized surgery had been performed, not once did
he complain regarding the surgery -- up to and including his
discharge from the hospital on May 21, 1987 at 1:30 p.m., a
complete week after his admission.

He also never voiced any

protest or complaint to Dr. Capel during any of his postoperative
visits with the defendant.

He filed his Notice of Intent to

Commence a Malpractice Action a year and a half after the
surgery; this was the first time Dr. Capel learned Michel was
dissatisfied.
Finally, there is no evidence in the record that the patient
suffered any harm arising out of the health care rendered.

No

expert would testify that the surgery was the proximate cause of
the patient's persistent pain.

(Transcript, pp. 61-62, 77-79.)

In a frank discussion before the court, plaintiff's attorney
admitted that he could not prove the plaintiff was damaged by the
operation.

(Transcript, pp. 96-7 and 104.)

In other words,

there was no factual foundation establishing a causal connection
between the operation and the plaintiff's suffering.

The

evidence from Dr. Capel and Dr. Reed Fogg, plaintiff's subsequent
treating physician, indicated the surgery was "successful"; the
largest component of any residual problems was psychological.
(Tr. 67, 81 and 88-89. )
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that Dr. Capel performed surgery on March 15, 1987 without his consent.

Plaintiff

does not claim the surgery was unnecessary; nor that there was
anything improper with regard to the operative technique; nor
that Dr. Capel failed to properly inform him regarding the
prospective surgery.
Since the inception of this lawsuit, plaintiff has attempted
to fashion the facts of this case into some theory of recovery.
He has failed and should fail on this appeal because there was
absolutely no tortious conduct on the part of the defendant.
The plaintiff alleges he did not consent to the procedure,
but his conduct as a matter of law demonstrates that he did.

The

Utah legislature anticipated this type of occurrence and mandated
that when a person submits to health care rendered by a health
care provider, it is presumed that what the health care provider
did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done.

As

a matter of public policy, a patient cannot keep his fingers
crossed behind his back and thereby place in jeopardy those who
rely on what he says and does.
In addition to the plaintiff's obvious implied consent to
treatment, express consent was obtained.

Again, by statute, in

Utah a spouse is authorized to sign on behalf of a patient.

It

is important to note there is no requirement that written consent
be obtained; nonetheless, in this case, a written consent was
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properly obtained and was in full compliance with the provisions
of the Utah Code which provides that such a written consent
"shall be a defense to any malpractice action against a health
care provider . . ."

Section 78-14-5(2)(e), Utah Code Ann.

(1953, as amended).
Next, plaintiff attempts to state a claim for a lack of
informed consent, but he has never denied that he was properly
informed and he has been unable to establish damages were proximately caused by defendant's surgery.

Thus, as a matter of law,

plaintiff fails to establish the requisite elements of a claim
for lack of informed consent as outlined in S 78-14-5(1) and
subparts (a) through (g), inclusive, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).
Next, plaintiff attempts to create a claim for common law
battery.
given.

This claim is similarly barred because consent was
Furthermore, common law battery has been subsumed by the

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act insofar as it can be applied to
health care providers.

In addition, the Utah Supreme court,

under similar facts, has already rejected such a technical
battery claim.

Baxter v. Snow, discussed infra at page 13.

As a last resort, plaintiff now asserts that the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act is unconstitutional.
arguments are misplaced.

However, plaintiff's

The plaintiff was not required to

submit to surgery; he, on his own volition, went to the hospital
and he accepted each of the procedures which led to the operating
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room.

He never once made known to Dr. Capel any reluctance

regarding surgery.

He was not deprived of any right.

He could

have exercised his constitutional rights by putting on his shoes
and walking out the door.
Finally, public policy dictates that physicians and
hospitals must have the ability to obtain consent from someone
other than a patient.

Here, Dixie Medical Center did so only to

insure that the patient would not come back later and say that he
had been given pain medications and therefore his consent was
improperly obtained.

Hospitals all across America have similar

guidelines requiring hospital staff to obtain signed consent from
representatives of patients who have been given pain medications.
Such a practice does not violate constitutional rights.
Consequently, none of plaintiff's attempts to recover
against defendant for surgery he requested and obtained have any
merit.

There simply was no tortious conduct on the part of

Dr. Capel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO RELY UPON THE
CONSENT EXPRESSED BY THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF
AND OBTAINED FROM PLAINTIFF'S WIFE.
A.

Implied Consent.
When a person submits to health care, "it shall be presumed

that what the health care provider did was either expressly or
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impliedly authorized to be done."

Utah Code Ann. S 78-14-5(1)

(1953, as amended).
This statutory presumption had its inception in the early
case of Baxter v. Snow, 2 P.2d 257 (Utah 1931).

There, the

patient claimed that the defendant doctor treated him without his
consent.

The court held that the patient's voluntary submission

to an examination and to treatment by the doctor and his acquiescence in the doctor's acts impliedly authorized the doctor to
diagnose the plaintiff's case and to use any reasonable treatment
he deemed necessary.

The voluntary submission by the plaintiff

to the physician for care and treatment was deemed to have
evidenced the patient's consent to the operation.

Consequently,

the court concluded it is erroneous to instruct the jury that
surgery without consent is a technical battery.
In the present case, as in Baxter, the conduct of the
patient evidenced consent to the surgery.

Similar results were

reached in Charley v. Cameron, 528 P.2d 1205 (Kan. 1974), which
involved an obstetrical patient with a stated fear of forceps.
Because neither she nor her husband stated a clear objection to
their use during the delivery, the court found as a matter of law
that consent to surgical treatment had been granted by the
conduct of the patient.

Further, once such implied consent has

been given, there can be no recovery for battery.
1210-11.
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528 P.2d at

In Grannum v. Berard, 422 P.2d 812 (Wash. 1967), the patient
claimed pain medications given after admission to the hospital
for planned surgery so clouded the patient's judgment that the
written consent was invalid.

The Washington Supreme Court was

unpersuaded and held:
The rule is well established that in surgical cases,
consent to such procedure must be obtained from either
the patient, or, if the patient is under some disability, from a near relative capable of giving
consent. Such consent to surgery may be manifested in
a number of ways: as an express consent the patient
may sign a formal written permission or agree orally;
or he may give implied authority by his conduct, as in
voluntarily submitting to an operation or by failing to
object.
422 P.2d at 814, cites omitted.

Thus, regardless of the question

of express consent, the court determined implied consent authorized the surgery as a matter of law.
The court then concluded:
We do not believe there is room for reasonable minds to
differ that the plaintiff has failed to overcome by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence the presumption
that he comprehended the nature, terms and effect of
the consent given for the surgical operation.
Id. at 815.

The court then affirmed the trial court's directed

verdict in favor of the defendant.
Here, as in Grannum, plaintiff has failed to produce the
required "clear, cogent and convincing evidence11 necessary to
rebut the statutory presumption that the health care rendered was
authorized.

Conversely, Dr. Capel, by statute and by Utah case
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law directly on point, was absolutely entitled to rely on the
implied consent of this patient.
Consequently, since both the Utah statutory provision for
medical consent and case law recognize that consent to a medical
procedure can be impliedly given and because such implied consent
was given in the present case, the plaintiff cannot prevail upon
any of his proposed causes of action.
B.

Spousal Consent.
Section 78-14-5(4)(b) of the Utah Code specifically

authorizes any married person to consent to health care for a
spouse.

(Addendum D.)

Therefore, Dr. Capel was absolutely

entitled to rely on Mrs. Lounsburyfs express consent to her
husband's surgery.

(See "Admissions" set forth as Addendum F.)

Further, while there is no requirement written consent be
obtained, the written consent form Mrs. Lounsbury signed complied
fully with the statutory requirements of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.

The form, once signed, became a complete

defense absent circumstances not present here:
It shall be a defense to any malpractice action against
a health care provider based upon alleged failure to
obtain informed consent if: . . . (e) the patient or
his representative executed a written consent which
sets forth the nature and purpose of the intended
health care and which contains a declaration that the
patient accepts the risk of substantial and serious
harm, if any, in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial
results of health care and which acknowledges that
health care providers involved have explained his
condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asked about the

-15-

health care and its attendant risks have been answered
in a manner satisfactory to the patient or his
representative . . .
S 78-14-5(2)(e), Utah Code Ann, (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
Thus, along with impliedly authorizing the surgery by his
conduct, the hospital staff properly obtained written express
authorization.

Dr. Capel was clearly entitled to rely on the

patient's apparent and stated decision to proceed with scheduled
surgery.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A CLAIM OF LACK OF
INFORMED CONSENT.
To establish "lack of informed consent," plaintiff must
prove all of the statutory elements encoded in subsection (1) of
§ 78-14-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
Younqblood, 711 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah 1985).

Burton v.

Thus, in order for

the plaintiff to recover damages from the defendant based on the
defendant's alleged failure to obtain consent, the plaintiff was
required to have established:
(a) That a provider/patient relationship existed
between the patient and health care provider; and
(b) the health care provider rendered health care to
the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out
of the health care rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient
serious harm; and
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(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial
and significant risk; and
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the patient's
position would not have consented to the health care
rendered after having been fully informed as to all
facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In
determining what a reasonable, prudent person in the
patient's position would do under the circumstances,
the finder of fact shall use the viewpoint of the
patient before health care was provided and before the
occurrence of any personal injuries alleged to have
arisen from said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health care rendered
was the proximate cause of personal injury suffered by
the patient.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1953, as amended).
In the present case, the plaintiff did not proffer any
evidence proving that the operation performed by the defendant
proximately caused any injury or damage to his person.

In fact,

the plaintiff's attorney was unable to find even one medical
expert willing to testify that the operation more probably than
not caused or increased the plaintiff's current physical
problems.
In addition, the court found, based on the proffer of evidence, that plaintiff was fully informed regarding the surgery.
Further, the court was not persuaded a reasonable person would
have objected under the same circumstances—that is, months of
pain and disability; unsuccessful attempts at conservative
management; several concurring opinions regarding the need for
surgery; the threat of losing disability benefits unless surgery
was performed.
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Consequently, the trial court properly ruled plaintiff had
not presented sufficient facts to support a claim for lack of
informed consent.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PREVAIL ON A CLAIM FOR
BATTERY.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act specifically subsumes
all torts which could conceivably arise within the context of a
patient/physician relationship.

Section 78-14-3 defines the

following terms: "Health care" is defined as "any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed
or furnished, by any health care provider for, to, or on behalf
of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or
confinement."
"Malpractice action against a health care provider" is
defined as "any action against a health care provider, whether in
contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise,
based upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out
of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the
health care provider."
Finally, "tort" is defined as "any legal wrong, breach of
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately
causing injury or damage to another."
Based on these statutory definitions, the plaintiff cannot
avoid application of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act to the
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facts of this case by attempting to frame his complaint as a
claim for battery.

In other words, "labeling the act an inten-

tional tort does not change the action from what it is, a species
of medical malpractice."

Sistrunk v. Hoshall, 530 So.2d 935

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
Generally, operating on a patient without the patient's
consent is considered a form of medical malpractice, and not
battery.

Vargas v. Rosal-Arcillas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1981).

For

example, in Revord v. Russell, 401 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. App.
1980), the court held that:
An action prefaced on the doctrine of informed consent
is now considered as one based on negligence, not
BATTERY, an intentional tort. See Natanson v. Kline,
1960 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, modified, 187 Kan.
186, 354 P.2d 670; Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) 165,
166. Thus, as in any negligence case a plaintiff must
show a duty owed to him and a breach of that duty (by
falling below the set standard of care) which proximately causes a compensable injury. (Emphasis in
original.)
Likewise, in Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (N.Y.A.D.
1980), the Court noted that the conduct of the parties should be
measured by a negligence as opposed to an assault and battery
analysis in malpractice actions.

The Dries court concluded:

We believe that medical treatment beyond the scope of a
patient's consent should not be considered as an intentional tort or species of assault and battery as it has
been viewed in the past. Other authorities note that
"negligence standards which deal with the possession
and use of skill and due care better accord with the
realities of the physician-patient relationship.11 (1
Louisell and Williams, Medical Malpractice § 8.09.)
Dries, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
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For these reasons, the case of Eis v. Chestnut, 627 P.2d 124
(N.M. 1981), upon which the plaintiff heavily relies, is easily
distinguishable.

Furthermore, even New Mexico closely circum-

scribes the application of battery in the context of a medical
malpractice action:
To defeat a battery claim, however, the information
which must be disclosed is quite narrow in scope. A
physician only has to inform the patient of the nature
of the procedure; that is, what the doctor proposes to
do to him.
Geretv v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180, 191 (N.M. 1978) (emphasis in
original).

The Geretv court added:

"It is now generally held

that an action involving lack of informed consent does not lie
within the traditional concepts of battery."

589 P.2d at 192.

Thus, the only question relevant in a battery case, as
recognized in New Mexico, is whether the patient was advised of
and impliedly authorized the medical treatment which was going to
be performed.

In the present case it is undisputed that the

plaintiff was informed of the nature of the procedure prior to
the operation; therefore, even under New Mexico's law the
plaintiff could not recover on a theory of battery.
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POINT IV
NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT HAS BEEN VIOLATED.
A.

This Case is Distinguishable From Cases Involvina
Constitutional Rights.
Under the facts of this case, constitutional claims are not

properly invoked.

Here, Dr. Capel was acting in compliance with

statutory law and case law; he was fully entitled to rely on such
legal authority.
Furthermore, plaintiff's constitutional rights were not
violated by the defendant's reliance on the patient's implied
consent and on the wife's written consent.

There is no justi-

fication or need for defendant to address the constitutionality
of legislation from a hypothetical viewpoint.
The factor which distinguishes the cases cited by plaintiff
from the present case is the voluntary nature of the conduct
involved.

The factual setting of this case is repeated daily in

thousands of hospitals across the country.

Patients who submit

to care voluntarily are not being deprived of constitutional
rights.
In contrast, the refusal to allow hospital personnel and
medical doctors to rely upon written consent of others in this
type of factual setting will have one of two consequences:

(1)

providers will be unfairly placed at risk if they proceed with
care that may be life saving; or (2) they would let patients go
without care, a potentially fatal consequence.
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This Court need not venture into a discussion of constitutional issues because no such issues are involved.

The factual

setting presented here of a patient who consents by deed, if not
by word, and of a spouse who consents after her husband has
voluntarily received medication which impairs his legal capacity
involves no constitutional violations.
Finally, the legislature acted properly and appropriately in
addressing the issue of consent.

It is not the function of this

Court to evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of
legislative enactments.

Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake City Com'n, 624

P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981).
B.

Plaintiff Was Not Deprived of His Rights to Privacy.
Plaintiff, in order to establish his constitutional right to

privacy was violated, must rebut the presumption that health care
rendered by a health care provider was either expressly or
impliedly authorized.

Further, he must prove that he refused to

consent to the surgery performed by Dr. Capel.

Plaintiff must so

prove by "clear, cogent and convincing evidence.ff

Grannum, 422

P.2d at 815.
There is absolutely no evidence that the plaintiff advised
defendant he objected to the medical care rendered.

Despite the

fact he had ample opportunity to convey his reluctance and withdraw his consent to surgery, there is simply nothing in the
record to indicate he did so.
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Thus, the plaintiff exercised his constitutional right to
privacy by asking Dr. Capel to perform the surgery, by coming to
the hospital as scheduled, by assisting with the preoperative
steps.

He could have as easily exercised his constitutional

rights by standing up and walking out of the hospital.
would have tried to stop him.

No one

No one wanted him to have surgery

he did not choose to have.
Finally, to require more of Dr. Capel under the circumstances of this case would be unfair and unworkable.
not be expected to read minds.

He should

Public policy dictates surgeons

should be entitled to rely on conduct evidencing consent and on
hospital policies which require spouses to sign for patients who
have received pain medication.

Further, public policy would

endorse the legislature's prerogative to identify those people
who have capacity to sign for and give consent on behalf of
another individual.

Doctors should not be required to proceed at

their own risk; rather, they should be entitled to rely on
methods for a patient to be informed and to evidence consent
which are legally enforceable in a court of law.
C.

Utah's Informed Consent Provision Is Constitutional.
Utah courts have strongly and consistently upheld the

constitutionality of the provisions of the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.

Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635

P.2d 30, 31-32 (Utah 1981).

See, also, Yates v. Vernal Family

-23-

Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); McGulre v. University of
Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Utah 1979); and Vealev v.
Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978).
Furthermore, Utah's Health Care Malpractice Act, in particular the informed consent provision of that Act, is not unique.
Many states have similar statutory provisions.

E.g.. Fla. Stat.

Ann. § 766.103 (1990 Supp.); Ga. Code Ann. S 31-9-2 (1985); Idaho
Code § 39-4303 (1985); N.C. Gen. Stat. S 90-21.13 (1985 & 1989
Supp.)*

Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, courts

have addressed the constitutionality of informed consent statutes
similar to Utah's and have found them to be constitutional.
E.g., Parikh v. Cunningham, 493 So.2d 999 (Fla. 1986); Dixon v.
Peters, 306 S.E.2d 477 (N.C.App. 1983).

No case could be found

holding an informed consent provision unconstitutional.
D.

The Open Courts Provision Has Not Been Violated.

As stated above, plaintiff could not prevail on a battery
claim even if he could raise it. Nonetheless, the plaintiff
suggests that section 78-14-5 of the Medical Malpractice Act is
unconstitutional because it denies him a remedy for common law
battery in a malpractice claim.

However, courts have held the

legislature may abolish a common law cause of action regardless
of the "open courts" provision.

Hartford Fire Ins. v. Lawrence,

740 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir. 1984).
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The legislature has the power to abrogate old laws and
create new ones.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah

1985), this court stated:
. . . neither the due process nor the open courts
provision constitutionalizes the common law or otherwise freezes the law governing private rights and
remedies as of the time of statehood. It is, in fact,
one of the important functions of the Legislature to
change and modify the law that governs relations
between individuals as society evolves and conditions
require.
Id. at 676.

Berry does, however, recognize some limits to the

legislature's ability to change or modify the law.

Id.

Specifically, Berry imposed a two-part test for determining
whether or not a legislative enactment violates the open courts
provision of the Utah Constitution.

Under the Berry test, Art.

I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution is satisfied if:
(1)

the law provides the injured person an effective remedy

"by due course of law;" or
(2)

if there is no substitute or alternative remedy

provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if:
(a)

a social or economic evil is eliminated; and

(b)

the elimination of an existing remedy is not an

arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective.

Id.

at 680.
To begin with, section 78-14-5 provides the plaintiff with a
reasonable alternative to the common law tort of battery.
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The

plaintiff contends that since the elements of the statutoryalternative differ from those of the common law tort, the substitute remedy is not substantially equal to the one at common law.
Under such a rule, no law could ever be modified; any new statutory provision could only be a re-enactment of the common law.
Obviously, as society changes, and as advancements in
technology are made, the law must change.

Furthermore, the

modifications or changes in the law need to address current
societal problems.

This is just what the legislature did when it

enacted the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act.

The legislators

addressed a current societal problem: the medical malpractice
insurance crisis.

See, Section 78-14-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as

amended).
Consequently, because the express declaration of the Actfs
purpose set forth in Section 78-14-2 satisfies the second prong
of the Berry test, the Act does not violate the open courts
provision of the State Constitution.

Moreover, since the statute

is a substitute for the common law tort of battery, the first
prong of the Berry test is also met.

Thus, the Utah Health Care

Malpractice Act satisfies the open courts provision of the State
Constitution.
E.

Substantive Due Process Claims Do Not Apply.
The Due Process Clause prohibits the taking of "property"

without due process of law.

The plaintiff contends that his due
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process rights were violated because the common law cause of
action for battery in context of a malpractice claim was abrogated when it was subsumed into the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act.
However, what the plaintiff fails to realize is that he does
not have a property interest in a cause of action until it
becomes "vested" by virtue of an injury having been done.

See

Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933); Masich v. United States
Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 624 (Utah 1948);
Hunter v. School District, 293 N.W.2d 515 (Wis. 1980).

In Munn

v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1977), the Supreme Court indicated:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any
rule of the common law. That is only one of the forms
of municipal law, and is not more sacred than any
other. Rights of property which have been created by
the common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be
changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations.
Indeed the great office of statutes is to remedy
defects in the common law as they are developed and to
adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.
94 U.S. at 134.
In addition, even if the plaintiff had a vested or property
interest in the abrogated battery claim, his due process rights
were not violated since the legislature provided a substitute
cause of action, or quid pro quo, in return.

See, Masich, 191

P.2d at 624; Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d
903, 910 (Ohio 1976).

Furthermore, it does not matter that this

quid pro quo does not benefit the plaintiff individually, as long
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as society as a whole benefits therefrom.

Masich, 191 P.2d at

624 (Utah 1948).
CONCLUSION
There is no cause of action which supports plaintiff's
claims for relief and there should not be.

To allow a plaintiff

to recover under the facts of this case would make it impossible
to render medical care to patients.

It would require surgeons to

be mind-readers and allow patients to accept medical treatment
but keep their fingers crossed behind their backs regarding their
"true" intentions.

It would allow patients to recover whenever

the desired benefits of care were not achieved even though the
care was skillfully and appropriately rendered.
been violated.

No rights have

No tortious act has been committed.

The only

injustice would be if self-serving claims unsupported by any
evidence, such as the claims presented by Mr. Lounsbury, were
somehow ratified by the legal system.

Dr. Capel did as he was

asked and did it well.
DATED this /7

day of September, 1990.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
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Section
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78-14-7JL.
78-14-7.5.
78-14-8.
78-14-9.

78-14-9.5.
78-14-10.
78-14-11.
78-14-12.

78-14-13.
78-14-14.
78-14-15.

78-14-16.

Ad damnum clause prohibited in complaint
Limitation of award of noneoonomic
damages in malpractice ****«'»*•
Limitation on attorney's contingency fee
in malpractice action,
Notice of intent to commence action.
Professional liability insurance coverage
for providers — Insurance commissioner may require joint underwriting
authority.
Periodic payment of future damages in
malpractice actions.
Actions under Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Act not retroactive — Exception.
Department of Commerce to provide
panel — Exemption — Piuceduiea —
Statute of limitations tolled — Composition of panel — Expenses — Department authorized to set license fees.
Proceedings — Authority of panel —
Rights of parties to proceedings.
Decision and recommendations of panel
— No judicial or other review.
Evidence of proceedings not admissible
in subsequent action — Panelist may
not be compelled to testify — Immunity of panelist from civil liability.
Proceedings considered a binding arbitration hearing upon written agreement of parties — Compensation to
members of panel

78-14-1. Short title of act
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Utah Health Care Malpractice Act."
it7S
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations—
Purpose of act.
The legislature finds and declares that the number
of suits and claims for damages and the amount of
judgments and settlements arising from health care
has increased greatly in recent years. Because of
these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and
increased claims is increased care cost, both through
the health care providers passing the cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient
as a potential adversary in a lawsuit Further, certain health care providers are discouragedfromcontinuing to provide services because of the high cost
and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these
trends are producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by
enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide health-related, malpractice insurance while at the same time
establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability
of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable
from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions
may be commenced against health care providers
while limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide
ADDENDUM A

other procedural changes to expedite early e v euJ m ^
and settlement of daims.
*uo*
78-14-3. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Audiologisi" means a person licensed u
practice audiology under Chapter 41, Title &a
(2) ^Certified social worker" means a per**
licensed to practice as a certified social worker at
provided in Section 58-35-5.
(3) Chiropractic physician* means a person U.
censed to practice chiropractic under Section
58-12-50 through 58-12-56, the Chiropractic 1*.
ptofeiucnts Act.
(4) "Commissioner* means the ^"mnissioner
of insurance as provided in Section 31A-2-10Z
(5) "Dental hygienist* means a person licensed
to practice dental hygiene as defined in Section
58-7-1.1.
(6) "Dentist" means a person licensed to practice dentistry as defined in Section 58-7-1.1.
(7) "Future damages" includes damagesforfin
ture medical treatment, care or custody, loss of
future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
(8) "Health care" means any act or treatment
performed or furnished, or which should hav«
been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during
the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement.
(9) "Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, association, corporation, or
other facility or institution who causes to be rendered or who renders health care or professional
services as a hospital, physician, registered
nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwife,
dentist, dental hygienist, optometrist, clinical
laboratory technologist, pharmacist, physical
therapist, podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic
physician, naturopathic physician, osteopathic
physician, osteopathic physician and surgeon,
audiologist, speech-language pathologist, certified social worker, social service worker, soctal
service aide, marriage and family counselor,
practitioner of obstetrics, or others rendering
similar care and services relating to or arising
out of the health needs of persons or groups of
persons and officers, employees, or agents of any
of the above acting in the course and scope of
their employment.
(10) "Hospital* means a public or private institution licensed under the Hospital Licensing Act
(11) "Licensed practical nurse" means a person
licensed to practice as a licensed practical nurse
as provided in Section 58-31-10.
(12) "Malpractice action against a health care
provider" means any action against a health care
provider, whether in contract, tort, breach oj
warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based
upon alleged personal injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider.
(13) "Marriage and family therapist" means •
person licensed to practice as a marriage thenpiat or family therapist as provided in Section
58-39-6.
(14) "Naturopathic physician* means a person
licensed to practice naturopathy as defined »n
Section 58-12-22.
ADDENDUM B
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(15) "Nurse-midwuV means a person licensed
to practice nurse-midwifery as provided in Secuo n 58-44-7.
(16) "Optometrist" means a person licensed to
practice optometry as defined in Section
58-16-H.
(17) "Osteopathic physician" means a person
licensed to practice osteopathy under Sections
5$. 12-1 through 58-12-7, the Utah Osteopathic
Medicine Licensing Act
(18) "Patient" means a person who is under
the care o£ a health care provider, under a contract, express or implied.
(19) Tharxnacist" means a person licensed to
practice pharmacy as provided in Section
58-17-2.
(20) "Physical therapist" means a person licensed to practice physical therapy as provided in
Section 58-24-6.
(21) "Physician" means a person licensed to
practice medicine and surgery under Sections
58-12-26 through 58-12-43, the Utah Medical
Practice Act.
(22) Todiamst" means a person licensed to
practice podiatry under Chapter 5, Title 58.
(23) "Practitioner of obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice as a physician in this
state unaer Sections 58-12-26 through 58-12-43,
the Utah Medical Practice Act.
(24) '"Psychologist" means a person licensed to
practice psychology as denned in Subsection
58-25a-2(3).
(25) "Registered nurse" means a person licensed to practice professional nursing as provided in Section 58-31-9.
(26) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney-in-fact, or other
legal agent of the patient.
(27) "Social service aide" means a person licensed to practice as a social service aide as provided in Section 58-35-5.
(28) "Social service worker" means a person
licensed to practice as a soaal service worker as
provided in Secnon 58-35-5.
(29) "Speech-language pathologist" means a
person licensed to practice speech-language pathology under Chapter 41, Title 58.
(30) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of
duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission
proximately causing injury or damage to another,
its*

WV<VM

(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care-provider has affirmatively
acted tofraudulentlyconceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent
concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all
persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons,
partnerships, associations and corporations and to ail
health care providers and to all malpractice actions
against health care providers based upon alleged personal usuries which occurred prior to the effective
date of this act; provided, however, that any action
which under former law could have been commenced
after the effective date of this act may be commenced
only within the one lapsed portion of time allowed
under former law; but any action which under former
law could have been commenced more than four years
after the effective date of this act may be commenced
only within four years after the effective date of this
act.
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78-14-4^. Amount of award reduced by
amounts of collateral sources available to plaintiff — No reduction where
subrogation nght exists — Collateral
sources defined — Procedure to preserve subrogation rights — Evidence
admissible — Exceptions.
(1) In all malpractice actions against health care
providers as defined in Subsection 78-14-3(29) in
which damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses sustained, the court shall reduce the
amount of such award by the total of all amounts paid
to the plaintiff from all collateral sources which are
available to him; however, there shall be no reduction
for collateral sources for which a subrogation nght
exists as provided in this section nor shall there be a
reduction for any collateral payment not included m
the award of damages. Upon afindingof liability and
an awarding of damages by the trier of fact, the court
shall receive evidence concerning the total amounts
of collateral sources which have been paid to or for
the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available
to nun. The court shall also take testimony of any
amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited
by, or on behalf of the plaintiff or members of his
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — immediate family to secure his nght to any collateral
Application.
source benefit which he is receiving as a result of his
(1) No malpractice action against a health care injury, and shall offset any reduction m the award by
provider may be brought unless it is commenced such amounts. No evidence shall be received and no
within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis- reducuon made with respect to future collateral
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence source benefits except as specified in Subsection (4).
should have discovered the injury, whicheverfirstoc(2) For purposes of this section "collaterai source"
curs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the means payments made to or for the benefit of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except plaintiff for:
that:
(a) medical expenses and disability payments
(a) In an action where the allegation against
payable under the United States Soaal Secunty
the health care provider is that a foreign object
Act, any federal, state, or local income disability
has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
act, or any other public program, except the fedthe claim shall be barred unless commenced
eral programs which are required by law to seek
within one year after the plaintiff or patient dissubrogation;
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
(b) any health, sickness, or income disability
should have discovered, the existence of the forinsurance, automobile accident insurance that
eign object wrongfully left in the patients body,
provides health benefits or income disability covwhichever first occurs; and
erage, and any other similar insurance benefits.

78-14-5
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except life insurance benefits available to the
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or
provided by others;
(c) any contract or agreement of any person,
group, organization, partnership, or corporation
to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental, or other health care services, except benefits received as gifts, contributions, or assistance made gratuitously; and
(d) any contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any other
system intended to provide wages during a period
of disability
(3) To preserve subrogation rights for amounts
paid or received pnor to settlement or judgment, a
provider of collateral sources shall serve at least 30
days before settlement or trial of the action a written
notice upon each health care provider against whom
the malpractice action has been asserted. The written
notice shall state the name and address of the provider of collateral sources, the amount of collateral
sources paid, the names and addresses of all persons
who received payment, and the items and purposes
for which payment has been made.
(4) Evidence is admissible of government programs
that provide payments or benefits available m the
future to or for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent available irrespective of the recipient's ability to
pay Evidence of the likelihood or unlikelihood that
such programs, payments, or benefits will be available in the future is also admissible. The trier of fact
may consider such evidence m determining the
amount of damages awarded to a plaintiff for future
expenses.
(5) No provider of collateral sources is entitled to
recover the amounts of such benefits from a health
care provider, the plaintiff, or any other person or
entity as reimbursement for collateral source payments made prior to settlement or judgment, including any payments made under Chapter 19, Title 26,
except to the extent that subrogation rights to
amounts paid prior to settlement or judgment are
preserved as provided in this section. All policies of
insurance providing benefits affected by this section
are construed in accordance with this section.
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78-14-5. Failure to obtain informed consent —
Proof required of patient — Defenses
— Consent to health care.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered
by a health care provider, it shall be presumed that
what the health care provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient to recover damages from a health care provider
in an action based upon the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove the
following:
(a) that a provider-patient relationship existed
between the patient and health care provider,
and
(b) the health care provider rendered health
care to the patient; and
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health care rendered; and
(d) the health care rendered carried with it a
substantial and significant risk of causing the
patient serious harm: and
(e) the patient was not informed of the substantial and significant nsk; and
(f) a reasonable, prudent person m the patient's position would not have consented to the
health care rendered after having been fully inADDENDUM C
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formed as to all facts relevant to the decision to
give consent In determining what a reasonable
prudent person m the patient's position would <fc
under the circumstances, the finder of fact shall
ate the viewpoint of the patient before health
care was provided and before the occurrence of
any personal injuries alleged to have ansen from
said health care; and
(g) the unauthorized part of the health car*
rendered was the proximate cause of persona] m.
juries suffered by the patient
(2) It snail be a defense to any malpractice actum
against a health care provider based upon alleged
failure to obtain informed consent if:
(a) the risk of the serious harm which the a*,
tient actually suffered was relatively minor, or
(b) the risk of serious harm to the patient from
the health care provider was commonly known %Q
the public; or
(c) the patient stated, prior to receiving the
health care complained of, that he would accept
the health care involved regardless of the risk: or
that he did not want to be informed of the matters to which he would be entitled to be informed,
or
(d) the health care provider, after considennf
all of the attendant facts and circumstances, used
reasonable discretion as to the manner and extent to which risks were disclosed, if the health
care provider reasonably believed that additional
disclosures could be expected to have a substan
oal and adverse effect on the patient's condition
or
(e) the patient or his representative executed a
written consent which sets forth the nature and
purpose of the intended health care and which
contains a declaration that the patient accept!
the nsk of substantial and serious harm, if any,
in hopes of obtaining desired beneficial results of
health care and which acknowledges that health
care providers involved have explained his condition and the proposed health care in a satisfactory manner and that all questions asaed about
the health care and its attendant risks have been
answered in a manner satisfactory to the pauent
or his representative; such written consent shall
be a defense to an action against a health are
provider based upon failure to obtain informed
consent unless the patient proves that the person
giving the consent lacked capacity to consent or
shows by clear and convincing proof that the execution of the written consent was induced by u*
defendant's affirmative acts offraudulentnutrepresentation or fraudulent omission to stst*
material facts.
.
(3) Nothing contained in this act shall be eonstm**
to prevent any person eighteen years of age or ^
from refusing to consent to health care for his •*•
person upon personal or religious grounds.
(4) The following persons are authorized a n d **j
powered to consent to any health care not prohibit
by law;
(a) any parent, whether an adult or s to***
for his minor child;
(b) any married person, for a s P ouse: ,^ 0 p#.
(c) any person temporarily standing »n ,oCO J£
rentis, whether formally serving or not «* ^
mmor under his care and any guardian *<>
Wmrt;
ver**
(d) any person eighteen years of age or o
his or her parent who is unable by reason o
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483)
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh. Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHEL LOUNSBURY,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 89-2550
Judge J. Philip Eves

NEAL C. CAPEL, M.D.,
Defendant.

This action came on regularly for jury trial on January 29,
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable J. Philip
Eves presiding.

The plaintiff appeared personally and by and

through his counsel, Floyd W. Holm, Esq. of Chamberlain & Higbeer
and defendant appeared personally and by and through his counsel,
Elliott J. Williams, Esq. and. Elizabeth King Brennan, Esqv oil
Snow, christensen & Martineau~

The parties- selected a jury and

presented opening statements.
After the parties' opening statements, the parties
stipulated that plaintiff, could present a proffer of evidence
which the Court could then rely upon to determine whether a

ADDENDUM E

sufficient factual and legal basis had been shown to submit the
case to the jury.

Plaintiff, through his counsel, presented a

proffer on the record of evidence he anticipated his witnesses
would offer should they be called to testify.

At the conclusion

of the proffer, defendant made a Motion to Dismiss based on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented in light of the statutory
requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act, S78-14-1, et
seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
The Court now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff, Michel Lounsbury was injured in an

industrial accident on October 10, 1986.
2.

Plaintiff was admitted to Dixie Medical Hospital for

surgery on May 14, 1987.
3.

On the morning of surgery, a consent form authorizing

surgery was signed by plaintiff's wife.
4.

The surgical consent form authorized surgery by Dr.

Capel for Michel Lounsbury.
5.

The surgery authorized was the surgery performed by Dr.

Capel.
6.

There is no evidence of fraudulent concealment or

fraudulent omission to state material facts on the part of Dr.
Capel.
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This action is a medical malpractice action against a

health care provider which is governed by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, $78-14-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953 as
amended).
2.

Mrs. Lounsbury was authorized and empowered by the

provisions of Section 78-14-5(4)(b) to consent to health care
rendered to her husband.
3.

The consent form the plaintiff's spouse, Janet

Lounsbury, signed on her husband's behalf complied with the
provisions of Section 78-14-5(2)(e), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).
4.

Dr. Capel was authorized as a matter of law to rely on

said consent in performing the surgery.
5.

When a person submits to health care rendered by a

health care provider, it is presumed that what the health care
provider did was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be
done.

Section 78-14-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
6.

The consent form executed by the plaintiff's spouse

provides a complete defense to plaintiff's claim of alleged
failure to obtain his consent to the surgery.
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7.

Plaintiff also failed as a matter of law to establish

the other elements of a claim for lack of informed consent as
outlined in Section 78-14-5(1), Subsections (a) through (g). To
prevail on a claim for lack of informed consent, plaintiff must
establish each and every element of said section. However, in
this case plaintiff offered no evidence that he suffered personal
injuries arising out of the health care rendered, as required by
subsection (c); nor that a reasonable prudent person in the
patient's position would not have consented to the health care
rendered after having been fully informed as to all the facts
relevant to the decision to give consent as required by
subsection (f); nor that the unauthorized part of the health care
rendered was the proximate cause of personal injuries suffered by
the plaintiff, as required by subsection (g).
8.

Further, by failing to produce evidence of physical

damages which were proximately caused by Dr. Capel's conduct,
plaintiff's claim for lack of informed consent fails as a matter
of law.
9.

In a negligence action against a health care

professional, plaintiff must establish, usually through expert
testimony, that the defendant's conduct deviated from recognized
and accepted standards and that said conduct was a proximate
cause of the damages as alleged by the plaintiff. Based on
plaintiff's proffer, the court finds as a matter of law that the
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evidence does not establish negligence on the part of the
defendant, nor that defendant's conduct proximately caused
physical damages.
10.

The plaintiff in this medical malpractice action cannot

recover for emotional or psychological damages because there is
no evidence establishing proximate causation.

Thus, defendant

Dr. Capel can not be held accountable for unforeseeable
psychological consequences of his surgery, whether it be
successful or unsuccessful.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as well as on the stipulation and evidence proffered by the
parties, the court grants the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
orders that plaintiff's Complaint be, and the same is hereby,
dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ T. Philip Eyes
J. Philip Eves
District Court Judge
12\EKB\l022<f.593\Findings
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FLOYD W HOLM U522]
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
250 South Main Street
P.O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

6

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

7

WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

8
9

MICHEL LOUNSBURY,

10
11
12
13

ANSWERS TO REQUEST
FOR ADMISSIONS

Plaintiff,
vs.
NEAL C. CAPEL, M.D.,
Defendant.

14

STATE OF UTAH

15

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

16
17

Civil No. 89-2550

)

:ss.

)

I, MICHEL S. LOUNSBURY,

b e i n g first

duly sworn upon oath

depose

and s a y that I am t h e Plaintiff in the above entitled action, that I have read

18

the following Answers to Request for Admissions and that the same are true

19

and correct to the b e s t of my knowledge, information and belief.

20

REQUEST

NO.

1:

Admit

that

the

document

entitled

"Consent

to

21

Operation, A n e s t h e t i c s , and Other Medical Services" (hereinafter referred to

22

as t h e "Consent form") attached hereto as Exhibit "A" i s genuine and i s a

23

t r u e and accurate copy of the original.

24

ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 1:

25

REQUEST NO. 2:

Admitted.

Admit Janet Lounsbury signed the Consent form on

May 15, 1987, at approximately 7:00 a . m .
HAMBERLAIN
& HIGBEE
TTOHNIYS AT LAW
M O SOUTH MAIN
P. O. BOX 72S
CCOAR C I T Y .
UTAH B 4 7 2 0
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1

ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 2:

2\

REQUEST NO. 3:

3

Admitted.

Admit Janet Lounsbury was the spouse of plaintiff

Michel Lounsbury on May 15, 1987, when she signed the Consent form.

4

ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 3:

5

REQUEST NO. 4:

Admitted.

Admit Janet Lounsbury signed the Consent form prior

6

to the time plaintiff Michel Lounsbury was taken to the operating room for

7

performance of the operation at issue in this lawsuit.

8
9
10

ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 4:

Denied.

It was at the same time Plaintiff

was taken to the operating room and was already under anesthesia.
REQUEST

NO. 5:

Admit the Consent

for relates to the operation

11

performed on Michel Lounsbury on May 15, 1987, which is at issue in this

12

lawsuit.

13

ANSWER TO REQUEST NO. 5:

14

DATED this ,j?

Admitted.

day of CJ^tJ/l^^

1989.

^ t ?

15
16

MICHEL S. L'OtfNSBtfRi*

17

sworn to before me this 3TX=< d&Y of //,

18
19

Notary PUDSC

20

/

21
22
23

APPROVED FOR SUBMISSION:

24

CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE

25
T L O Y ^ H0L>I
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CHAMBERLAIN
& HIGBEE
A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW
ZSO S O U T H
P. O. SOX
CEDAR

MAIM
72*

CITY.

UTAH 8 4 7 2 0

/ ^ ' / V ^
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1
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

2
3
4
5
6
7

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWERS TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS to Elliot J. Williams, Esq.
at SNOW, CHRISTEN SEN & MARTINEAU, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84145, by first class mail, postage fully prepaid on this
1989

W,«/ »

-

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

:HAMBERI_AIN
& HIGBEE
T T O R N E Y 1 AT UAW
ISO SOUTH MAIN
P. O . B O X 7 X 6
CZDAK CITY.

Secretary

/

/^£pday of

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to appellant, postage prepaid, this
day of September, 1990.

Elizabeth King

